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FOREWORD
Fall 2018 Symposium: All on Board?
Board Diversity Trends Reflect Signs
of Promise and Concern
Lisa M. Fairfax*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that while there is considerable reason to be optimistic
about the possibility that board diversity efforts will create meaningful change
in the number of women who occupy board positions, that optimism must be
tempered by certain trends suggesting that the board diversity effort will con-
tinue to confront challenges. The recently enacted California law mandating
board diversity has the potential to significantly increase board diversity not
only at those companies that fall within the law’s purview, but also with re-
spect to other companies that may be motivated to increase their board diver-
sity efforts as a result of the legislative and public sentiments symbolized by
the law. Legal challenges, however, may mute the law’s impact and reach.
Then too, empirical trends as well as direct support and activism from a broad
array of influential members of the investment community, including the three
largest asset managers, BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, are strong in-
dicators of the potential for meaningful change related to board diversity. Em-
pirical trends, however, also reveal that board gender parity continues to be a
difficult, if not elusive, goal. Additionally, recent surveys reveal that many cor-
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ments. Thanks to Cassandra Crawford for her excellent assistance, and to Roger Fairfax, Jr. for
his support. All errors, of course, are mine.







      01/29/2020   09:32:14
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 8 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN501.txt unknown Seq: 2 24-JAN-20 10:01
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porate directors and members of the investment community continue to ques-
tion the role and purpose of women on boards and thus still remain skeptical
about the value of women board members and board diversity efforts. Hence,
any optimism associated with board diversity efforts must be tempered.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2018, in conjunction with The George Washing-
ton Law Review, I hosted a conference on Women and Corporate
Governance aimed at exploring the role and impact of women in the
corporate governance landscape. The conference explored the role
and impact of women on boards, in the C-suite, on the judiciary, and
as regulators. This Article focuses on women on the board of directors
and argues that while there is considerable reason to be optimistic
about diversity efforts at the board level and the possibility that those
efforts will create meaningful change in the number of women who
occupy board positions, there remains some cause for caution and
concern.
In recent years, there has been considerable support from many
different sources generating significant momentum around gender di-
versity on corporate boards. Perhaps more importantly, members of
the investment community have engaged in specific direct action
aimed at pressuring corporations to diversify their boards. Those ac-
tions appear to have translated into increased board diversity and
there are many signs suggesting that such an increase will continue in
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road ahead will continue to feature barriers that may impede the
quest for advancement in this area.
Part I of this Article focuses on the recently enacted California
law mandating board diversity and offers some thoughts about the po-
tential impact of that law. Part II demonstrates the various reasons for
optimism about board diversity by pinpointing the empirical trends as
well as the support and direct action being embraced by an array of
participants in the investment community. Those trends and actions
strongly suggest that meaningful progress may be made in the area of
gender diversity. Part III offers some notes of caution, pinpointing
several reasons why the current focus on board diversity may not nec-
essarily yield the kinds of results anticipated by its supporters.
At the outset, it should be noted that this Article, like the confer-
ence, only focuses on gender diversity or diversity as it relates to the
presence of women on boards. This Article, however, acknowledges
that while there are advocates of board diversity who are also con-
cerned with increasing the presence of racial and ethnic minorities on
boards, much of the current momentum related to board diversity—
including the recent California law—focuses exclusively on gender di-
versity. While one hopes that the push for gender diversity will include
a push to increase the number of women directors from racial and
ethnic groups, the emphasis on gender otherwise clearly excludes ra-
cial and ethnic minorities who are men. For those interested in board
diversity more broadly, this exclusion may be troubling because it is
not clear that increasing the number of women on boards can or is
intended to lead to an increase in other forms of board diversity. From
this perspective, any optimism associated with board diversity is also
tempered by this concern.
I. CALIFORNIA DREAMIN’?
Any conversation about board diversity would be incomplete
without discussion of the recently enacted California law pursuant to
which California became the first state to impose a diversity require-
ment on public corporations.1 The new law, enacted on September 30,
2018, applies to any corporation with securities listed on a major pub-
lic stock exchange and whose principal executive office is in Califor-
nia, even if the corporation is organized under the laws of a state
other than California.2 Any corporation subject to the law must have
1 See S.B. 826, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018).






      01/29/2020   09:32:14
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 9 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN501.txt unknown Seq: 4 24-JAN-20 10:01
1034 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1031
at least one female director by 2019.3 By the end of 2021, corporations
with five board members must have at least two female directors,
while those with six or more directors must have at least three female
directors.4 The law enables the California Secretary of State to impose
fines on noncompliant corporations of $100,000 for the first violation
and $300,000 for subsequent violations.5
On its face, the law could have a considerable impact on gender
diversity because of the sheer number of corporations that fall within
its purview and because the law would require a significant number of
corporations to increase the number of women on their boards to
comply with its mandate. According to a California State Senate re-
port, there are some 761 publicly traded companies headquartered in
California.6 This represents about 20% of all publicly traded corpora-
tions.7 More importantly, a significant number of corporations appear
to be currently out of compliance with the law’s mandate.8 The legisla-
tion enacting the law stated that 26% of Russell 3000 companies based
in California have no women directors on their boards, while only
12% of such companies have three or more women on their boards.9
Moreover, one study indicated that if the law’s 2021 requirements
were in effect today, some 79% of companies impacted by the law
would be out of compliance with the law.10 Collectively, these findings
indicate that if corporations comply with the California law, the law
will significantly enhance the number of women serving on public cor-
poration boards.
Some critics of the California law, however, have strenuously in-
sisted that it is illegal as applied to most, if not all, of the corporations
to which it purports to apply, rendering the law’s impact “trivial” at
best and meaningless at worst. Professor Joseph Grundfest, among
3 See id. The law defines female as any person who self-identifies as a woman, regardless
of the person’s designated sex at birth. See id. § 2(f)(1).
4 See id. § 2(b)(1)–(2).
5 See id. § 2(e)(1).
6 See Richard Vernon Smith, California Mandates Female Representation on Public Com-
pany Boards, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2018/10/
01/california-mandates-female-representation-public-company-boards/#6fb4e2f81775 [https://
perma.cc/5CK8-REXW].
7 Current data indicates that there are approximately 3,671 public companies. See Jason
M. Thomas, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 16, 2017, 7:10
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone-1510869125
[https://perma.cc/L7JZ-A86V]. This figure represents a decline from the 1990s in which there
were some 7,322 public companies. See id.
8 See Smith, supra note 6. R
9 See S.B. 826 § 1(e)(3); Smith, supra note 6. R
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others, has argued that the law represents an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause to the extent it seeks to apply to corpo-
rations with principal executive offices in California, but that are
incorporated in a state outside of California.11 This reasoning stems
from the internal affairs doctrine, which requires that the law of a cor-
poration’s state of incorporation regulates the internal affairs of a cor-
poration, including matters between the corporation and its officers,
directors, and shareholders.12 Traditionally shareholder voting and
board composition have been viewed as internal affairs.13 The Su-
preme Court not only has endorsed the internal affairs doctrine, but
also has indicated that violations of the internal affairs doctrine consti-
tute a constitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.14 In CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,15 the Supreme Court suggested
that so long as a state only sought to regulate the internal affairs of the
corporations it created, the state’s regulations would not run afoul of
the Constitution.16 The corollary to such suggestion is that state efforts
to regulate corporations incorporated outside of the state would run
afoul of the Constitution. Based on this logic, the California law can
be viewed as unconstitutional to the extent that it seeks to regulate
the internal affairs of corporations incorporated outside of Califor-
nia.17 In other words, as Grundfest asserts, the law is unenforceable, at
least with respect to those corporations incorporated outside of Cali-
fornia.18 If this assertion is accurate, it would dramatically decrease
the number of corporations impacted by the law, amounting to what
Grundfest calls “trivial gains” in the number of women appointed to
boards as a result of the law.19
Other legal challenges have the potential of rendering the law
wholly irrelevant. Indeed, it is also possible that the law could be chal-
lenged on Equal Protection grounds. In fact, California’s own legisla-
11 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: The
Inevitable Failure of California’s SB 826, at 2 (Stanford Law Sch. & The Rock Ctr. for Corp.
Governance, Working Paper No. 232, 2018).
12 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
13 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (indicating that share-
holder voting rights reflected an internal affair or otherwise a matter regulated by a corpora-
tion’s state of incorporation); Grundfest, supra note 11, at 3. R
14 See, e.g., CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 78; Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645–46.
15 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
16 See id. at 89.
17 See Grundfest, supra note 11, at 3. R
18 See id. at 4.
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tive analysis conceded this possibility.20 Moreover, Grundfest insists
that the possibility of an Equal Protection challenge poses a serious
threat to the evolution of the affirmative action doctrine.21 In
Grundfest’s view, such a threat, particularly when weighed against the
potentially trivial benefits associated with the law, renders the law es-
pecially problematic.22 Even without this attendant threat, if an Equal
Protection challenge is successful, the law would be struck down in its
entirety, ensuring that no corporation would be required to increase
diversity on their board as a result of the law.23
To be sure, California has indicated that there is a path forward
for the law despite these legal questions. On the one hand, it is en-
tirely possible that corporations potentially subject to the law or orga-
nizations acting on their behalf are gearing up to challenge the law’s
legality. While acknowledging the possibility of legal challenge, the
California law’s sponsors nevertheless appeared to believe that the
law would be able to survive such challenges.24 The law’s sponsors,
thus, insisted that there are many internal matters governed by Cali-
fornia law that nevertheless impact the internal affairs of corporations
incorporated outside of California.25 Moreover, while the law’s spon-
sors acknowledged that the law could confront a “difficult challenge”
in seeking to overcome constitutional concerns, the sponsors did not
concede that defending its constitutionality would be impossible.26 On
the other hand, it also seems plausible that corporations would be re-
luctant to openly challenge the law because such a challenge could
create the risk of backlash by supporters of diversity and gender eq-
uity. For example, the public outcry and negative publicity after Ama-
zon, Inc., opposed a proposal from shareholders aimed at promoting
the consideration of diversity in the board nomination process caused
Amazon to quickly change gears and agree to adopt the proposal even
without a shareholder vote.27 Amazon’s example highlights the poten-
20 See SB 826: Hearing Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018
Sess. 8 (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter Assembly Judiciary Committee Report].
21 See Grundfest, supra note 11, at 7. R
22 See id.
23 See id. at 2.
24 See Assembly Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 20, at 8. R
25 See id. at 6; Grundfest, supra note 11, at 3. R
26 See Assembly Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 20, at 7. Grundfest also insists R
that the impact of a challenge on equal protection grounds poses a tremendous collateral risk for
the affirmative action doctrine, giving its opponents the opportunity to significantly undermine
that doctrine and its efforts at ensuring diversity. See Grundfest, supra note 11, at 7. As a result, R
Grundfest insists that any gains made by the law would come at significant risks. See id.
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tial for backlash and serves as a cautionary tale for companies that
would oppose board diversity efforts, and thus begs the question re-
garding whether companies would be willing to challenge the Califor-
nia law and risk such backlash at all.
Even if the law is challenged and ultimately invalidated, it re-
mains possible that the law nevertheless will prompt corporations to
enhance their gender diversity efforts. Notably, notwithstanding these
legal questions, participants at the conference—several of whom are
directly involved with organizations that promote board diversity ef-
forts—maintained that some organizations focused on board diversity
had already received inquiries from companies in California about
how best to diversify their board.28 These inquiries suggest that the
law has motivated corporations to at least consider enhancing board
diversity. These inquiries further suggest that the increased attention
on board diversity generated by the law may encourage corporations
to increase gender diversity on their boards.
It is also possible that the law will have an impact on gender di-
versity beyond those corporations directly covered by the law. This is
because California’s actions may prompt more companies to diversify
their board in order to demonstrate their commitment to gender di-
versity efforts, to avoid any unwanted attention, or otherwise to fore-
stall any efforts from their own legislature.29
California’s actions could also encourage other states to take ac-
tion, thereby enhancing diversity efforts on a broader scale. Other
states have pending legislation related to board diversity, including Il-
linois, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.30 To be sure, the possibility or
reality of a legal challenge could discourage these and other states
from following California. These other states, however, do not have
Candidates. Now It’s Embracing the ‘Rooney Rule.,’ FORTUNE (May 15, 2018), https://fortune.
com/2018/05/15/amazon-board-diversity-rooney-rule/ [https://perma.cc/JMW3-WL92]. The pro-
posal, modeled after the “Rooney Rule” requiring NFL teams to consider diverse candidates
when making decisions related to hiring for top coaching positions, sought to require the Ama-
zon board to interview at least one woman or minority candidate for any board opening. Id. At
the time of the shareholder proposal, Amazon had an all-white board consisting of three women
and seven men. Id.
28 See Press Release, The George Washington Law Review, Women and Corporate Gov-
ernance: A Conference Exploring the Role and Impact of Women in the Governance of Public
Corporations (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.gwlr.org/symposium-2018-women-and-corporate-gov
ernance-a-conference-exploring-the-role-and-impact-of-women-in-the-governance-of-public-
corporations/ [https://perma.cc/5A4A-SGJ9].
29 See, e.g., Detrick, supra note 27. R
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the same mandate as California and hence may not raise the same
legal concerns.31 In addition, if the California law is successfully chal-
lenged, it could provide a road map for other states relating to how
best to craft legislation aimed at board diversity.
The law also could prompt federal action, which would have
broad repercussions for diversity efforts. Indeed, there are companion
bills in the House and Senate related to board diversity.32 While the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) already has a provision
requiring corporations to explain whether or not the company consid-
ers diversity as a factor in its nomination process, there have been
several efforts aimed at pressuring the SEC to enhance its board di-
versity measures.33 Apparently in response to recent trends in this
area, the SEC issued new interpretations related to board diversity
disclosures.34 Even if these efforts prove unsuccessful, they could nev-
ertheless spur more corporations to enhance their board diversity
efforts.
Finally, it is entirely possible that California’s actions could spur
increased shareholder activism in this area. Grundfest insists that
shareholder activism offers a superior approach to the California law
because it could have a broader reach without the legal issues and
attendant risks associated with the California law.35 This is because
shareholder activism can be nationwide and thus not limited to Cali-
fornia, but also because shareholder activism has proven successful
with respect to other matters.36 However, it is important to note that
sometimes successful legal challenges can spur shareholder activism
related to the challenged issue. For example, in 2011, the D.C. Circuit
overturned a “proxy access” law aimed at enhancing shareholders’
voting rights by giving shareholders the right to nominate director
31 See id.
32 See Howard Dicker et al., D.C. Speaks Up: A Push for Board Diversity from the SEC
and Congress, WEIL (Feb. 8, 2019), https://governance.weil.com/featured/washington-d-c-speaks-
up-a-push-for-board-diversity-from-congress-and-the-sec/ [https://perma.cc/94TR-SA4P]. The
bills would require public companies to disclose data related to the racial, ethnic, and gender
composition of its board as well as whether the board has a policy aimed at promoting board
diversity. See id.
33 See Ning Chiu, Congressional Lawmakers Push SEC Chairman to Focus on Board Di-
versity Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 6, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/06/congressional-lawmakers-push-sec-chairman-to-focus-on-
board-diversity-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/H7SE-Y4NA].
34 See Dicker, supra note 32. R
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candidates of their choice on a corporation’s proxy statement.37 Soon
after, proxy access became the most popular issue around which
shareholders engaged in activism and their activism led to a steep rise
in the number of public corporations that adopted proxy access.38
Eventually shareholder activism related to proxy access became so in-
tense that corporations began voluntarily adopting proxy access provi-
sions prior to any proposal or shareholder vote.39 Importantly, the
dominant proxy access provision adopted by public corporations es-
sentially mirrored the one struck down by the D.C. Circuit.40 While
proxy access and board diversity are two very different issues, the ex-
periences with proxy access at least suggest that it may be possible
that the spotlight and attention associated with the California legisla-
tion and any legal challenges not only could encourage greater share-
holder activism around the issue, but also could encourage boards to
enhance their diversity efforts as a result of such activism.
Ultimately, it is likely too soon to tell how the California law will
impact board diversity efforts. At the very least, however, the law has
stimulated further conversation about board diversity and how best to
increase the number of women on boards.41 Moreover, the law serves
as a tangible sign of the increased momentum associated with efforts
aimed at increasing the number of women serving on corporate
boards.
37 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
38 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5–6 (2016), https://
www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2016_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FL8-C8H6] [hereinafter 2016 PROXY SEASON REVIEW]; SULLIVAN & CROM-
WELL LLP, 2015 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 4–5 (2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publica
tions/SC_Publication_2015_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/78Y4-8FVJ] [hereinaf-
ter 2015 PROXY SEASON REVIEW].
39 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5–9 (2017), https://
www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ER9Q-KYV3].
40 Compare id. at 6 (noting that most companies that adopted a proxy access provision
opted for a “3/3/20/20,” which has become the market standard and, in relevant part, calls for
three percent ownership for three years), with Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147 (vacating an
SEC rule that mandated the same).
41 See, e.g., Jeff Green et al., Wanted: 3,732 Women to Govern Corporate America, BLOOM-
BERG (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-women-on-boards/ [https://
perma.cc/7S2Y-6UNB]; Cydney Posner, California Mandates Quotas for Board Gender Diver-
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II. A CHANGE IS GONNA COME?
Even if the California legislation has no impact on board diversity
efforts, there is considerable reason to be optimistic about the poten-
tial for other factors to meaningfully enhance the number of women
directors on corporate boards. This optimism stems from the growing
support for board diversity, particularly among influential sharehold-
ers and their advocates. It also stems from the fact that these support-
ers have adopted specific strategies aimed at increasing the number of
women on corporate boards. As Grundfest insists, the adoption of
these strategies is critical to the success of any activism in this area.42
Optimism also stems from the fact that corporations have been re-
sponding to these strategies by stepping up their diversity efforts. Fi-
nally, this optimism stems from the empirical trends which bolster the
notion that shareholder activism and other organized efforts to pro-
mote diversity have translated into important changes in overall board
composition. This Part highlights these trends and changes.
A. Coalitions of Support
One reason for optimism around the potential for meaningful
change related to board diversity is the growing support for board di-
versity from corporate stakeholders with the ability to significantly in-
fluence corporate behavior. Most notably, the three largest asset
managers have been very vocal in their support of board diversity.43
In 2018, BlackRock, Inc., the world’s largest money manager,
stated publicly for the first time that the companies in which it invests
should have at least two women on the board.44 Larry Fink, Black-
Rock’s CEO, also publicly announced his intention to emphasize the
42 See Grundfest, supra note 11, at 8. R
43 See Liam Kennedy, Top 400 Asset Managers 2018: 10 Years of Asset Growth, IPE (June
2018), https://www.ipe.com/reports/special-reports/top-400-asset-managers/top-400-asset-mana
gers-2018-10-years-of-asset-growth/10025004.article [https://perma.cc/PNY9-52RZ] (identifying
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street as the three largest asset managers).
44 See BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES (2019); see also
Sarah Krouse, BlackRock: Companies Should Have At Least Two Female Directors, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 2, 2018, 2:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-companies-should-
have-at-least-two-female-directors-1517598407 [https://perma.cc/G8A3-RU64]; Cydney Posner,
BlackRock Advocates that At Least Two Women Be on Each Company Board, COOLEY PUBCO
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://cooleypubco.com/2018/02/06/blackrock-advocates-that-at-least-two-women
-be-on-each-company-board/ [https://perma.cc/4RY7-G5UH]; Claire Zillman, These Are the 12
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importance of board diversity when engaging with public companies.45
In 2017, The Vanguard Group (“Vanguard”), the world’s second larg-
est asset manager, posted an open letter to directors of public compa-
nies indicating its expectation that boards focus on gender diversity
and noting that whether a company had exhibited meaningful pro-
gress on board diversity over time would impact Vanguard’s engage-
ment and voting.46
State Street Global Advisors, Inc. (“State Street”), the third larg-
est asset manager,47 has been one of the first to visibly and vocally
support board diversity.48 In 2018, State Street published new voting
guidelines stating its expectation that boards include at least one fe-
male director.49 In 2017, State Street planted a Fearless Girl statue
across from Wall Street’s Charging Bull statue both as a tangible sym-
bol of its support for gender diversity and as a signal of its increased
commitment to ensuring that companies diversify their boards.50
This visible and vocal support both individually and collectively
has the potential to significantly influence the behavior of a considera-
ble number of corporate boards. As the world’s largest asset manager,
BlackRock owns a stake in almost every publicly traded company and
is the single biggest shareholder in many of those companies.51 In fact,
BlackRock owns at least five percent of more than half of all publicly
traded companies.52 Thus, BlackRock can and does wield significant
influence in its role as both shareholder and asset manager. In recent
years, observers have noted that BlackRock has almost outsized influ-
45 See BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP’S APPROACH TO ENGAGE-
MENT ON BOARD DIVERSITY 1 (2018).
46 See F. WILLIAM MCNABB III, AN OPEN LETTER TO DIRECTORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
WORLDWIDE (2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/governance-letter-to-
companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKL4-HY66]. Among other things, the letter highlighted board
diversity as a key pillar of a good corporate governance practice. See id. at 1; SULLIVAN & CROM-
WELL LLP, supra note 30, at 23; Zillman, supra note 44. R
47 See State Street Global Advisors, https://www.ssga.com/home.html [https://perma.cc/
265U-44GJ].
48 See Zillman, supra note 44. R
49 See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines (2018); SUL-
LIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 23. R
50 See Zillman, supra note 44. R
51 See Shawn McCoy, How BlackRock Wields Vast Influence over Government & Econ-
omy, GV WIRE (July 9, 2018), https://gvwire.com/2018/07/09/how-blackrock-wields-vast-influ
ence-over-government-and-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/989Z-ZW8G]; The Rise of Black-
Rock, ECONOMIST (Dec. 7, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21591174-25-years-
blackrock-has-become-worlds-biggest-investor-its-dominance-problem [https://perma.cc/4LYW-
MPG9].
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ence over public companies.53 Indeed, many outside of the investment
community may have never even heard of BlackRock or otherwise
may not fully appreciate the power it has as the world’s largest asset
manager.54 Those within the investment community, however, fully
appreciate that BlackRock’s position not only enables it to command
the attention of almost any public company board, but also to have
considerable sway over the decisions made by those boards.55 In this
regard, BlackRock’s ability to wield significant influence over the
market and public corporations renders its vocal support of board di-
versity very significant. BlackRock’s decision to emphasize the impor-
tance of boards having at least two women directors is especially
significant because while many other large investors have expressed
general support for board diversity, few have articulated a specific
number, and none have articulated a number beyond one.56 Like
BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street have a sizeable stake in many
public companies and thus their support, particularly coupled with
BlackRock’s, has the potential to meaningfully move the needle on
corporate behavior as it relates to board diversity.57 Collectively, the
support from the three largest asset managers dramatically increases
the potential for change given their collective ownership in the public
market as a whole and hence their collective ability to both directly
and indirectly influence the behavior of public corporations and their
boards.
This support for enhanced gender diversity on boards appears to
be shared by the investment community more generally, thereby in-
creasing the potential that such support will translate into corporate
change. A 2018 Ernst & Young LLP survey revealed that over 80% of
asset managers, public pension funds, and other investors believed
that boards should focus on ensuring that boards have the “right mix
of members, including [having] women.”58 Consistent with these senti-
ments, some of the largest public pension funds have expressed their
53 See id. (noting that “perhaps no company in the world now has greater reach and influ-
ence over financial markets and governments”).
54 See The Rise of BlackRock, supra note 51 (noting that BlackRock’s name “rings few R
bells outside” the financial community).
55 See id.
56 See Krouse, supra note 44 (noting that investors that advocated for board diversity have R
“stopped short” of articulating a specific number).
57 See Zillman, supra note 44. R
58 Posner, supra note 44 (quoting Andrea Vittorio, Board Makeup Top Issue for Investors R
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support for ensuring that corporations increase the number of women
on their boards.59 In addition, the two largest proxy advisory firms
also have publicly stated their support for board diversity and have
published voting guidelines aimed at encouraging corporations to di-
versify their boards.60 Proxy advisory firms’ support of board diversity
is important because such firms have the ability to influence corporate
behavior as such firms advise public corporations regarding how best
to vote their shares and, in some cases, also advise corporations about
appropriate corporate governance practices.61 Even employees have
demanded that boards increase their diversity efforts.62 The fact that a
broad array of participants in the investment community have ex-
pressed their support for ensuring that boards diversify increases the
possibility that public companies will feel compelled to respond to
that support by enhancing their board diversity efforts. Thus, this
broad array of support is a positive sign that such enhancements will
occur.
Importantly, board members themselves have begun to profess a
desire for diversity. A Price Waterhouse Survey found that 94% of
directors expressed the belief that board diversity added value to the
boardroom.63 A 2018 Spencer Stuart survey of S&P 500 boards found
that 62% of board nominating committee members said that their
highest priority in board recruitment was locating a woman board
member, while 74% of such members said that board diversity was an
issue that the nominating committee needed to address over the next
three years.64
These expressions of support from board members are pivotal be-
cause the board in general, and nominating committee members in
particular, bear responsibility for identifying, recruiting, and nominat-
ing new board members.65 Their expressions of support therefore in-
59 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 39, at 4. R
60 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 23; e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER R
SERVS., 2019 AMERICAS PROXY VOTING GUIDELINE UPDATES 2 (2018), https://www.issgovern
ance.com/file/policy/latest/updates/Americas-Policy-Updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4MQ-F97X].
61 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 44. R
62 See Detrick, supra note 27 (noting that pressure from Amazon employees had a signifi- R
cant impact on Amazon’s decision to embrace a rule requiring it to consider at least one woman
or minority for each board opening).
63 See GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS CTR., PWC’S 2018 ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SUR-
VEY 2 (2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/annual-corporate-directors
-survey/assets/pwc-annual-corporate-directors-survey-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CY7-BDXJ].
64 See SPENCER STUART, 2018 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 35 (2018), https://
www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/july/ssbi_2018_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VFC-KU7E].
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crease the likelihood that general sentiments related to the
appropriateness of board diversity will translate into meaningful
change in board composition.
B. From Rhetoric to Reality
The increased optimism around the potential to enhance board
diversity also stems from the fact that these key stakeholders have
moved beyond mere vocal support to tangible action. These actors
have engaged in a variety of actions aimed at ensuring that corpora-
tions increase the diversity of their boards. The available evidence
suggests that these actions are yielding results in a number of impor-
tant ways.
1. Engaging on Diversity
In recent years, key stakeholders have stepped up their engage-
ment efforts related to board diversity. The three largest asset manag-
ers have clearly revealed their desire for enhanced engagement
related to board diversity.66 After erecting the Fearless Girl statue,
State Street launched a Fearless Girl campaign focused on pressuring
public companies to diversify their boards.67 Vanguard’s open letter
addressed to directors of public companies is also an example of its
efforts to engage with public companies.68 BlackRock sent letters to
all of the companies in the Russell 1000 (around 300 companies in
total) with fewer than two women on their boards “asking them to
disclose their approaches to diversity and to establish a timeframe for
improvement.”69
Other entities have similarly enhanced their engagement efforts.
Thus, two of the largest public pension funds, California Public Em-
ployee’s Retirement System (“CalPERS”), the largest public pension
fund in the United States, and the California State Teacher’s Retire-
ment System (“CalSTRS”), sent letters to hundreds of companies ask-
ing them to address the issue of board diversity.70 CalPERS alone sent
letters to more than 500 companies who lacked gender diversity on
INSIGHTS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://insights.diligent.com/nominating-governance-committee/what-
is-the-role-of-the-board-nominating-committee/ [https://perma.cc/7NYN-RXDE].
66 See Amy Whyte, State Street to Turn Up the Heat on All-Male Boards, INSTITUTIONAL
INV. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1b4fh28ys3mr9/State-Street-
to-Turn-Up-the-Heat-on-All-Male-Boards [https://perma.cc/2CKY-DWZ6].
67 See id.
68 See MCNABB, supra note 46. R
69 Posner, supra note 44. R
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their boards asking them to address how they planned to remedy such
a lack.71 In 2017, the third largest public pension fund, the New York
City Comptroller (“Comptroller”), who makes investment decisions
on behalf of the pension funds for New York City employees, began a
focused campaign to increase board diversity, known as the Boar-
droom Accountability Project 2.0.72 Pursuant to this Project, on Sep-
tember 8, 2017, the Comptroller sent letters to 151 of its portfolio
companies—80% of which are in the S&P 500—asking them to pub-
lish standardized annual disclosures on their board diversity.73 The
Comptroller’s decision to focus on board diversity is particularly nota-
ble because of the success the Comptroller has had with altering board
behavior in other contexts. In 2014, the Comptroller launched its first
accountability project, Boardroom Accountability Project, which fo-
cused on getting companies to adopt proxy access—the ability of
shareholders to access the company’s proxy statement in order to
nominate candidates of their choice.74 The Project was extremely suc-
cessful, resulting in a significant number of corporations adopting
proxy access.75 If the Comptroller experiences similar success in its
board diversity efforts, the Comptroller’s diversity Project 2.0 could
have a tremendous impact on increasing the number of women on
public company boards.
More broadly, the decision of each of these corporate actors to
engage with corporations on the issue of diversity is remarkable be-
cause shareholder engagement with corporate boards is a relatively
new phenomenon. Indeed, two decades ago, the idea of shareholder
engagement was almost non-existent because boards and shareholders
simply did not engage.76 Today, engagement is on the rise and has
become the new normal.77 Boards and shareholders, however, have a
than 500 U.S. Companies, CALPERS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/news-
room/calpers-news/2017/engagement-corporate-board-diversity [https://perma.cc/RAG9-422D].
71 See id.
72 See Arthur H. Kohn et al., Update on Board Diversity Developments, CLEARY GOT-
TLIEB (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.clearymawatch.com/2018/08/update-board-diversity-develop
ments/ [https://perma.cc/RAG9-422D].
73 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 19; GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS R
CENTER, supra note 63, at 20; Kohn, supra note 72. R
74 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 19. R
75 Indeed, from 2014 to 2018, we have gone from only a handful of companies with proxy
access to more than 60% of S&P 500 companies with proxy access bylaws. See Kohn, supra note
72; 2016 PROXY SEASON REVIEW, supra note 38, at 4–5. R
76 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 821,
827, 832.
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relatively finite amount of time and thus a limited agenda pursuant to
which shareholders must make a choice regarding the issues to priori-
tize and thus the issues around which they will engage.78 Indeed, some
corporations have complained that they have found it difficult to gain
an audience with shareholders in order to engage.79 Conversely, share-
holders have indicated that they have had to make difficult choices
about which corporations they will engage.80 From this perspective,
the fact that, among all of the corporate issues from which they could
choose to engage, shareholders have chosen to prioritize engagement
related to diversity is remarkable.
2. Withholding the Vote for Diversity
Investors also have waged “withhold the vote” campaigns de-
signed to pressure corporations and their directors to increase gender
diversity on their boards.81 A withhold the vote campaign is a targeted
campaign pursuant to which shareholders either vote no or withhold
their vote against particular directors in order to pressure such direc-
tors to step down, to signal dissatisfaction with some corporate action,
or to otherwise pressure directors to take a particular action.82 In the
context of board diversity, withhold the vote campaigns directly target
corporations and directors deemed to have failed to appropriately ad-
dress gender diversity on their boards.83 In 2018, State Street imple-
mented new guidelines stating it would vote against the entire slate of
board members on the nominating committee of any company that
failed to have a single woman on its board and failed to engage in
successful dialogue related to board diversity.84 BlackRock also an-
nounced that it would vote against directors on boards that have not
made meaningful progress on board diversity.85 Public pension funds
have adopted similar policies. CalSTRS announced that it would be
78 See Tom Johnson, Shareholder Engagement: An Evolving Landscape, HARV. L. SCH. F.




81 See WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, “JUST VOTE NO” CAMPAIGNS IN UNCON-





83 See Whyte, supra note 66. R
84 See id.
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holding the entire board, and not simply members of its nominating
committee, accountable for a lack of board diversity.86 CalPERS also
stated that it would consider withholding votes against directors who
failed to appropriately respond to the lack of diversity on their
boards.87 Proxy advisory firms have also stepped up their actions in
this area. Both Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the largest
proxy advisory firm in the country, and Glass, Lewis & Company
(“Glass Lewis”), the second largest proxy advisory firm, which to-
gether advise on voting decisions related to about 97% of board meet-
ings, indicated that they would recommend votes against the
nominating chair of the board of any Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 com-
pany with no women on their boards.88
These campaigns have led to an increase in withheld votes target-
ing directors based on their lack of actual diversity or lack of effort to
increase diversity. For example, in 2018, State Street voted against di-
rectors at 581 companies that lacked a single female director because,
in State Street’s view, those companies had inadequately addressed
gender diversity on their boards.89 CalPERS withheld votes from 271
directors at companies that they believed had not improved their di-
versity efforts.90 BlackRock also voted against directors at five compa-
nies that failed to effectively address their board diversity concerns.91
These examples of the increased use of withheld votes related to
board diversity are consistent with broader trends. Indeed, votes
against directors on boards that lack women directors have more than
doubled since 2015.92 Votes against chairs of nominating committees
have increased the most, followed by votes against committee mem-
bers and votes against the entire board.93 Hence, the average withheld
vote against a director is about three to four percent.94 By comparison,
86 See GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS CENTER, supra note 63, at 20. R
87 See CalPERS Expands Engagement for Greater Diversity on Corporate Boards to More
than 500 U.S. Companies, supra note 70. R
88 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 60, at 3; SULLIVAN & CROM- R
WELL LLP, supra note 30, at 23. ISS will begin such a policy for annual meetings held on or after R
February 1, 2020. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 60. R
89 See GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS CENTER, supra note 63, at 20; Kohn, supra note 72. Simi- R
larly, in 2017, State Street voted against directors on nominating committees at some 400 compa-
nies that had no women directors on their boards. See Kohn, supra note 72; Krouse, supra note R
44; Posner, supra note 44. R
90 See GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS CENTER. supra note 63, at 20. R
91 See id.
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in 2018, directors targeted for the lack of diversity on their boards
have received withheld votes on average of 15%, 11%, and 5.6%
respectively.95
Withhold the vote campaigns can be an important mechanism for
encouraging corporations to increase the number of women on their
boards. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence reveals that withhold
the vote campaigns lead to changes in corporate behavior.96 Evidence
suggests that a high percentage of withheld votes, even if significantly
less than a majority, can influence board behavior, prompting boards
to take a variety of actions in response to withhold the vote cam-
paigns.97 Hence, relying on these campaigns to promote board diver-
sity also has the potential to encourage more boards to change their
policies with respect to diversity.
3. Shareholders Proposing Diversity
Shareholders also have been using the proposal process to ad-
vance gender diversity. Federal law allows shareholders to submit pro-
posals on the corporation’s proxy statement requesting that
companies take certain actions.98 Such proposals are then voted on by
other shareholders.99 There has been an upward trend in the number
of shareholder proposals related to board diversity, and most of these
proposals request increased disclosure related to board diversity.100
Shareholder proposals are another important tool that could im-
pact corporate behavior related to diversity. On the one hand, share-
holder votes on shareholder proposals are nonbinding.101 Thus, even
when shareholder proposals receive a majority of the shareholder
vote, corporations are not required to implement them.102 Impor-
tantly, very few shareholder proposals related to board diversity re-
95 See id.
96 See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention when Institutional Investor Ac-
tivists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 102 (2008); WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP,
supra note 81, at 1–2. R
97 See Del Guercio, supra note 96, at 102 (finding that withhold the vote campaigns influ- R
ence board behavior); WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, supra note 81, at 1–2. R
98 See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 63–65 (2011).
99 See id. at 63.
100 See Angelo Martinez, Shedding Light on Diversity–Based Shareholder Proposals,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://corpgov.law.har
vard.edu/2018/10/16/shedding-light-on-diversity-based-shareholder-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/
3TXR-ZLLJ]; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 22. R
101 See FAIRFAX, supra note 98, at 63. R
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ceive a majority of the shareholder vote.103 For example, only two
shareholder proposals related to board diversity passed in 2017,
whereas none passed in 2018.104 The fact that shareholder proposals
are nonbinding and rarely receive a majority vote may suggest that
such proposals are not very significant. Shareholders, however, use
the proposal process to gain the attention of corporate boards and
other shareholders regarding issues they believe to be important, and
to encourage corporations to take action with respect to those is-
sues.105 From this perspective, even when shareholder proposals re-
ceive less than a majority of the vote, they can be a crucial mechanism
for highlighting the importance of an issue. In some cases, corpora-
tions do in fact respond to proposals even when they receive less than
a majority of the vote.106 Indeed, the vast majority of shareholder pro-
posals related to board diversity are withdrawn before they come to a
shareholder vote.107 Typically, when a shareholder proposal has been
withdrawn, it suggests either that there has been increased engage-
ment related to the subject of the shareholder proposals or that the
corporation has come to an agreement to take action related to the
proposal.108 Hence, the large rate of withdrawn proposals strongly in-
dicates that corporations have responded to such proposals and that
such proposals are playing a role in moving the needle related to
board diversity.
4. Proxy Contests, Proxy Access, and Board Diversity
Proxy contests can also be used by shareholders to highlight and
encourage board diversity. A proxy contest is a public company elec-
tion contest pursuant to which shareholders nominate and run a slate
of directors different from those nominated and supported by man-
agement.109 Last year, for the first time in recent history, a majority
103 See Martinez, supra note 100 (noting that in 2017, only 2 out of the 24 proposals re- R
ceived a majority vote and passed).
104 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 22. R
105 See FAIRFAX, supra note 98, at 63–64. R
106 See Gender Diversity Shareholder Proposal Receives Record Support, SHAREHOLDER
ASS’N RES. & EDUC. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://share.ca/gender-diversity-proposal-constellation/
[https://perma.cc/7EGF-XM2N] (noting a corporate decision to increase the number of women
on its board on the heels of a shareholder proposal that received less than majority support).
107 See JANET GELDZAHLER ET AL., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, LESSONS FROM THE
2018 PROXY SEASON 25 (2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Lessons_on_2018_Proxy_
Season_Webinar_Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG5U-NXCN].
108 See id. at 4.
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female slate of directors was elected in a director election contest.110
Importantly, the challenging shareholders ran their campaign with an
explicit focus on gender diversity by emphasizing the fact that the
company, Destination Maternity, only had three women directors in
its 25 year history.111 The challenging shareholders’ slate included
three women and one male.112 Along similar lines, some have sug-
gested that the Comptroller may seek to use the proxy access right to
advance issues associated with board diversity.113
Proxy contests and proxy access could have an important impact
on increasing board diversity. As an initial matter, as was the case
with Destination Maternity, a successful proxy contest is one of the
most effective ways of altering board composition because it serves to
replace the existing board. In this regard, if shareholders are willing to
use the proxy contest to advance gender diversity, it can have a direct
and immediate impact. Indeed, it has long been understood that direc-
tor elections and elections for corporate control represent one of the
most important mechanisms for influencing board behavior because
election contests threaten board seats.114 Such elections help ensure
that directors act in the interests of shareholders by threatening those
directors with losing their seats. Using proxy contests and director
elections, therefore, could have meaningful implications for influenc-
ing board behavior related to board diversity.
5. The Yield for Diversity
Overall, the increase in support, engagement, and targeted cam-
paigns related to board diversity appears to have resulted in increased
diversity on boards. As a result of State Street’s efforts, more than 300
companies added a female director to their board, while another 28
companies have pledged to do so.115 Moreover, in 2018, State Street
noted gender diversity improvements at over 150 companies targeted
110 See Leslie Picker & Fahiemah Al-Ali, Even Destination Maternity Is Having a Gender
Diversity Debate About Its Board—and Dissident Women Win, CNBC (May 23, 2018, 1:43 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/even-destination-maternity-is-having-a-gender-diversity-de
bate-about-its-board.html [https://perma.cc/82MR-JUPK]; Shirley Westcott, Surprises from the
2018 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 27, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/27/surprises-from-the-2018-proxy-season/ [https://
perma.cc/N8TS-K9ET].
111 Picker & Al-Ali, supra note 110. R
112 See id.
113 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 19–20. R
114 See FAIRFAX, supra note 98, at 97. R
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by State Street or with which it had otherwise engaged.116 Addition-
ally, 49 of the companies targeted by the Comptroller’s Office elected
women or directors of color, while 24 companies publicly committed
to including a woman and a person of color in their candidate pool for
every future board search.117 This evidence reveals that these targeted
campaigns have made a difference, bolstering the notion that the cur-
rent environment of increased focus on board diversity will yield sig-
nificant results. The next Section highlights empirical evidence
supporting this notion.
C. Diversity by the Numbers
As an initial matter, the vast majority of large public corporations
already have at least some gender diversity on their board. As of 2018,
more than 99% of S&P 500 companies had at least one woman on
their board.118 In 2017, 97.6% of Fortune 500 companies had at least
one woman on their board.119 In the first quarter of 2018, 80% of Rus-
sell 3000 companies had at least one female director.120 As one com-
mentator has noted, these figures reveal that “[t]he all-male board is
entering endangered species territory.”121
Many of these companies also have moved beyond a single fe-
male director on their boards. As of 2018, 87% of S&P 500 boards had
two or more women on their boards, up from 80% in 2017.122 Moreo-
ver, 49% of S&P 500 boards have three or more women on their
boards.123 There are three or more women on 33% of Fortune 500
boards.124 In addition, 29% of S&P 1500 companies have three or
more women on the S&P 1500 board.125 Importantly, these numbers
reflect an upward trend. For example, the number of S&P 500 compa-
nies with two or more women grew by seven percent from 2017 to
116 See Kohn, supra note 72. R
117 See id.
118 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 3, 8 (noting that only three S&P 500 companies R
have no women directors).
119 See Zillman, supra note 44 (noting that 488 out of 500 Fortune 500 companies have at R
least one woman on their board).
120 See Kohn, supra note 72. R
121 Zillman, supra note 44 (noting that “all-male bastions are outliers”). R
122 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 3; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra R
note 30, at 26 (noting that approximately 90% of S&P 500 companies have two or more women R
on their boards, as compared to 58% of Russell 300 companies).
123 See EY CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, supra note 77, at 3. R
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2018, while the number of such companies with three or more women
on the board grew by 14% from 2015 to 2017.126
In recent years, there also has been a growing and record number
of new female board members, a key indicator that the increased sup-
port for board diversity has resulted in tangible results. According to a
study by Heidrick & Struggles, 2017 was “the biggest year for board
appointments of women since the firm started tracking [such] data in
2009.”127 In addition, 2017 was also “the biggest year-on-year in-
crease . . . ever recorded,” as well as “the largest absolute number of
female appointees.”128 “[W]omen accounted for 38.3% of all newly
named directors at Fortune 500 companies in 2017 . . . .”129 Hence, in
2017, of the 358 available board seats within the Fortune 500, 137 went
to women.130 This trend is mirrored at other companies. In 2018, wo-
men comprised 40% of the newly appointed directors at S&P 500
companies, a record.131 Women of color accounted for nine percent of
new directors at S&P 500 companies, up from six percent in 2017.132
Both of these figures represented record increases. Women also ac-
counted for 35% of new directors in the Russell 3000.133 These in-
creases are cause for considerable optimism and suggest that the
mounting support for board diversity has led to mounting numbers of
women occupying board seats.
The data also indicates that a growing and record number of first-
time board members are women, revealing an important expansion of
the pool of diverse board members. Women accounted for 40% of all
first-time board members in Fortune 500 companies.134 In 2018, wo-
126 See id. at 3, 19.
127 Heather Landy, Fortune 500 Companies Appointed a Record Percentage of Women to
Their Boards Last Year, QUARTZ WORK (July 26, 2018), https://qz.com/work/1340544/the-for
tune-500-appointed-a-record-percentage-of-women-to-boards-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/D2FQ-
P3LB] (discussing Heidrick & Struggles report); see HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE HEIDRICK &
STRUGGLES BOARD MONITOR: APPOINTMENTS OF WOMEN TO BOARDS HIT RECORD HIGH 2
(2018).
128 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 2. R
129 Landy, supra note 127; accord HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 2. R
130 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 2. The next highest absolute number was R
119 in 2015, while the low was 54 in 2010. Id.
131 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 3, 11 (women accounted for 36% of newly R
appointed S&P directors in 2017). Indeed, women and people of color comprised half of the
incoming class of S&P 500 directors for two consecutive years in 2017 and 2018. See id. at 1
(noting that while women made real strides on the diversity front, male minorities “saw their
advancement in the boardroom slow”).
132 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 11. R
133 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 30, at 26. R
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men similarly accounted for 46% of all first-time board members at
S&P 500 companies, while women of color accounted for 11% of first-
time directors.135
The growth in women as first-time board members is a pivotal
component of the effort to diversify boards. Obviously, the increase in
first-time female board members is important because it reveals an
increase in the overall number of women serving as board members.
However, it is also important for ensuring that the pool and pipeline
for women directors is robust. Historically, it was often the case that
the same women occupied multiple board seats.136 Hence, even when
the number of seats held by women increased, the overall number of
women holding those seats did not increase.137 The rise in the number
of first-time women directors is critical because it indicates not only
that the number of board seats held by women is expanding, but also
that the overall pool of women from which boards are choosing to
occupy those seats is expanding.
Similarly, the growing number of directors who are not current or
prior CEOs is a reason for optimism related to increased board diver-
sity. There are very few legal requirements associated with being a
board director and none of those requirements mandate that a direc-
tor have a particular employment background.138 Historically, how-
ever, many companies had a strong preference for directors who were
current or former CEOs, and thus many companies relied heavily on
that criteria when seeking to fulfill board seats.139 As a result, that
criteria became a de facto requirement for many director positions.
Such a requirement is a significant impediment for women because
women represent only a very small fraction of people who hold such
CEO positions.140 For example, in 2018, women held five percent of
members in the Fortune 500 had no prior experience. Id. at 3, 14 (noting that this figure was up
from 25% without board experience in 2016); Landy, supra note 127. R
135 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 12. Women accounted for 42% of first-time R
directors in 2017 and women of color accounted for 8% of first-time directors in 2017. Moreover,
more than half (60%) of first-time directors in 2018 were women or people of color. See id.
136 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women,
People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1105, 1118 (2005) (noting that corporations often “call[ed] on the same African American wo-
men to hold multiple directorships”).
137 See id.
138 See id. at 1113–14.
139 See id. at 1114.
140 See Landy, supra note 127 (noting that the pool of current and former CEOs is “over- R
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CEO positions at S&P 500 companies,141 and just under five percent
of such positions at Fortune 500 companies, which represented a 25%
drop.142 In 2017, there were no black women CEOs of Fortune 500
companies.143 And as of 2018, only two women of color occupied CEO
positions at Fortune 500 companies.144 Hence, focusing on CEOs as
the primary pipeline for directors seriously impedes board diversity
efforts. Currently, however, companies appear to have reduced their
focus on such officers when engaging in their board recruitment ef-
forts. The percentage of new directorships filled by current or former
CEOs fell to 47% in 2017, down from 50% in 2016, and 55% in
2013.145 Similarly, only 35.5% of newly appointed S&P 500 directors
were current or former CEOs.146 This trend further bolsters the notion
that the current climate will yield meaningful results related to board
diversity.
III. SOME NOTES OF CAUTION
To be sure, as the preceding Section suggests, there are many rea-
sons to be optimistic about the possibility of enhanced board diversity.
141 Women CEOs of the S&P 500, CATALYST (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.catalyst.org/re
search/women-ceos-of-the-sp-500/ [https://perma.cc/S7J3-EWQH] (noting that women hold 27
CEO positions at S&P 500 companies).
142 Claire Cain Miller, The Number of Female Chief Executives Is Falling, N.Y. TIMES (May
23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/upshot/why-the-number-of-female-chief-execu
tives-is-falling.html [https://perma.cc/JE2C-K72J]. The number of women CEOs hit a record
high of 6.4% in 2017, but then declined to under five percent in 2018, going from 32 to 24. Id.
These percentages are not much better in other top positions. Thus, only 22% of senior vice
presidents are women, while women are 18% less likely to be promoted to manager than their
male peers. Id.; see Valentina Zarya, The Share of Female CEOs in the Fortune 500 Dropped by
25% in 2018, FORTUNE (May 21, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/05/21/women-fortune-500-2018/
[https://perma.cc/WXV4-3RRP]. The numbers for women of color are also low. Thus, there has
only ever been one black female CEO of a Fortune 500 company, Ursula Burns, and she stepped
down in 2016. Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Soon, There Will Be Just 3 Black Fortune 500 CEOs,
CNN (Oct. 20, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/19/news/companies/black-ceos-
fortune-500/index.html [https://perma.cc/NF5K-RHWU]. Overall, the number of black CEOs is
also at a record low. See id. Currently there are only three black CEOs of Fortune 500 compa-
nies, at Merck, TIAA, and JCPenny. Id. In 2007, there was a record high of seven. See id.
143 Wiener-Bronner, supra note 142. R
144 Mary Mazzoni, Only Two Fortune 500 CEOs Are Women of Color. What’s up with
That?, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.triplepundit.com/story/2018/only-two-for-
tune-500-ceos-are-women-color-whats/11146 [https://perma.cc/GR2J-65TG].
145 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 3, 11; Landy, supra note 127. Men ac- R
counted for 77% of the current or former CEOs while women accounted for 23%, indicating
that men dominate this pool of appointees. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 11. R
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That optimism, however, must be tempered by some trends suggesting
that the board diversity effort will continue to confront challenges.
As an initial matter, there are still many companies that have no
gender representation on their boards. There are still 12 Fortune 500
companies and 585 companies in the Russell 3000 with no women on
their boards.147 These trends suggest that there are some companies at
which board diversity efforts have had no impact.
Then too, empirical evidence indicates that board diversity efforts
are more difficult at smaller companies. Again, that there are more
companies with all-male boards in the Russell 3000 reveals that the
complete absence of gender diversity is more prevalent outside of the
top 500 companies.148 Similarly, a 2018 study revealed that 50% of
Russell 300 companies had one or no women on their boards.149 The
study noted, “Big Companies Get it. Small Companies Don’t” and
discussed how smaller companies tend to be less diverse than larger
ones.150 For example, women hold 25% of the board seats at Russell
100 companies, compared to 21% at Russell 101 to 1000 companies,
17% at Russell 1001 to 2000 companies, and 13% at Russell 2001 to
3000 companies.151 In addition, not only is the percentage of women
on boards outside the S&P 500 smaller than at S&P 500 companies,
but also the disparity in gender diversity between such companies ap-
pears to be increasing over time.152 For example, the gap between
board gender diversity at the S&P 500 and the remaining companies
in the Russell 3000 went from 5.4% in 2009 to 8% in 2017.153 As one
commentator noted, “[w]hatever pressures are driving female repre-
sentation at the upper end of the market-cap range, they are much
weaker at the lower end of the range.”154 The result is that these
147 See Zillman, supra note 44. Five years ago, however, there were 42 Fortune 500 compa- R
nies with no women directors and ten years ago there were 69. See Kohn, supra note 72; Zillman, R
supra note 44. R
148 See Kristin Broughton, Small Companies Face Added Pressure to Put Women on
Boards, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 13, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-compa
nies-face-added-pressure-to-put-women-on-boards-11550070322 [https://perma.cc/J3VS-GNBR].
149 See 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS: GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 3 (2018), https://
www.2020wob.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2018_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QSS4-EGZX].
150 See id. at 3.
151 See id. at 4.
152 See id. at 3; Madison Sargis, Corporate Board Gender Diversity Is Increasing, but with
Caveats, MORNINGSTAR BLOG (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2019/02/28/
board-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/R79L-UE38].
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smaller companies are just now reaching the level of board diversity
already achieved by their larger counterparts.155
Even corporations that do have female board members are a long
way from gender parity. As one commentator has noted, women re-
present 51% of the population—and represent roughly 50% of the
United States labor force, hold 50% of managerial and professional
positions, and earn more than 50% of bachelor’s and master’s de-
grees156—but occupy barely a fraction of seats in the vast majority of
boardrooms.157 Indeed, only 10 S&P 500 boards (that is, two percent)
have 50% or more women on their boards.158 Similarly, as of early
2018, only three Fortune 500 boards had reached gender parity or bet-
ter.159 This lack of parity on specific boards is reflected in an overall
lack of parity. The portion of all Fortune 500 seats held by women in
2017 was just 22.2%, which is an increase of only 1.2% from 2016.160
Women of color only account for five percent of total Fortune 500
board seats.161 Women only hold 24% of board seats on S&P 500
boards, a two percent increase from 2017, and a six percent increase
from 2013.162 Women only represent 22% of directors at the largest
200 companies.163 From any perspective, these figures reveal that pub-
lic company boards are a long way from gender parity.
In addition, the rate of increase associated with gender represen-
tation on boards has been relatively slow.164 “In 2003, women held
13.6% of available board seats at Fortune 500 companies.”165 In 2018,
22.5% of such seats were held by women, which represents only a nine
percent increase over 15 years.166 If this rate of increase remains the
155 See id.
156 See Fairfax, supra note 136, at 1111 (citing statistics from 2002 and 2004). R
157 See Zillman, supra note 44. R
158 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64 at 3. Industries with the largest percentage of board R
diversity are utilities (28%) and consumer (27–28%), while energy (13%) and information tech-
nology (17%) have some the lowest percentages of women board members. See EY CENTER FOR
BOARD MATTERS, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, supra note 77 at 4. R
159 See Zillman, supra note 44 (citing study by Equilar). R
160 See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 2; Landy, supra note 127. R




162 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 4, 8. Overall female representation on S&P 500 R
boards was 22% in 2017, 18% in 2013, and 16% in 2008. Id. at 4, 8.
163 See Kohn, supra note 72. R
164 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 4. R
165 Fairfax, supra note 136, at 1110. R
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same, gender parity may not occur until 2063. To be sure, there has
been an acceleration in the rate of increase in recent years. As a result
of this acceleration, one firm has predicted that women will reach par-
ity by 2025.167 Even that firm, however, acknowledges that its predic-
tion depends on whether or not the rate of increase will remain the
same or contract over time.168
Reaching gender parity may prove difficult for several reasons.
First, the fact that the number of newly appointed women directors
has risen dramatically, but the overall percentage of women directors
increased only slightly may indicate that the vast majority of newly
appointed female directors are replacing other women on boards.169
Alternatively, it could be that companies are expanding the size of
their boards in order to achieve some level of diversity. Achieving di-
versity in this manner may prove less controversial because women
cannot be deemed to be displacing men. It ensures, however, that the
overall percentage of women holding boards seats remains relatively
low, while also making gender parity especially difficult to reach.170
Second, turnover on boards continues to be low.171 This means
that those seeking to diversify must either expand the number of over-
all board seats or wait until there is natural board turnover. As other
commentators have noted, low turnover on boards makes “moving
the needle on boardroom diversity . . . difficult.”172
Third, “not all corporate ears are attuned to the cries for more
female directors”;173 that is, not everyone is on board with board di-
versity. For example, in its statement opposing a shareholder proposal
related to board diversity, Amazon stated that adopting a rule requir-
ing consideration of diverse candidates for board seats “would not be
an effective and prudent use of the Company’s time and resources.”174
While Amazon eventually capitulated, its original stance underscores
the notion that boards continue to be reluctant to focus on board di-
versity.175 Echoing this sentiment, a Price Waterhouse Survey found
that while 94% of directors indicated a belief that board diversity ad-
ded value to the boardroom, 48% of directors believed that share-
167 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 127, at 5. R
168 Id.
169 See id. at 3; Landy, supra note 127. R
170 See Landy, supra note 127. R
171 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 64, at 1, 3. R
172 Id. at 3.
173 Zillman, supra note 44. R







      01/29/2020   09:32:14
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 21 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN501.txt unknown Seq: 28 24-JAN-20 10:01
1058 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1031
holders are too preoccupied with diversity, and 52% of directors
believed that diversity efforts resulted from political correctness.176
Moreover, 56% of directors believe that board diversity results in
nominating unneeded or unqualified directors.177 The discrepancy be-
tween those professing to believe in the benefits of diversity and those
indicating that such efforts result from political correctness strongly
suggests that many directors may be professing a belief in diversity
based on shareholder pressure or public perceptions rather than an
honest belief in diversity. It also suggests that many directors would
not focus on board diversity in the absence of such pressure or
perceptions.
Fourth, some surveys indicate that board recruitment practices
serve to undermine board diversity efforts. Thus, notwithstanding the
empirical trends suggesting a movement away from an overreliance on
executive experience, survey data indicates that such experience con-
tinues to play a dominant role in the board recruitment process. Ac-
cording to a 2017 Deloitte study, 90% of board members would see a
candidate without executive experience as unqualified to serve as a
director.178 In addition, almost 90% of boards believe that current or
retired CEOs are the most effective board members.179 This data sug-
gests that the promising statistics about the reduction in board mem-
bers who serve as CEOs may not be permanent or sustainable,
thereby undermining the board diversity effort. Finally, boards too
often rely on recruitment and selection processes that reinforce a lack
of diversity.180 For example, the Deloitte study also revealed that
boards source a majority of their candidates from other boards within
their own industry.181 As the survey suggests, this process favors candi-
dates with board experiences and reinforces the lack of diversity
within the board ranks.182 The beliefs and practices highlighted in the
study explain the gap between a board’s professed support for board
diversity and the actual board diversity results. They also underscore
the fact that board diversity efforts may continue to face hurdles.
176 See GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS CENTER, supra note 63, at 2. R
177 See id. at 18.
178 See DELOITTE, 2017 BOARD DIVERSITY SURVEY 9 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/about-deloitte/us-about-board-diversity-survey-seeing-is-
believing.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4JE-H2DS]. 81% of board members would expect that their
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Finally, gender parity may be difficult to achieve because it may
not necessarily be the goal of most board diversity advocates. Impor-
tantly, and with the exception of the California law which appears to
have a parity component,183 stakeholders who are pushing for gender
diversity have not been pushing for gender parity.184 Indeed, other
than BlackRock’s insistence that corporations have at least two direc-
tors, most other board diversity advocates have merely pushed for di-
versity without emphasizing a specific number.185 To be sure, many
groups have emphasized the importance of having more than one fe-
male director.186 This emphasis often stems either from research re-
lated to critical mass and hence the importance of having more than
one person from a diverse group in order for diversity efforts to be
effective, or from empirical evidence suggesting a correlation between
the presence of multiple women (generally at least two or three wo-
men) on the board and important financial results.187 The fact that the
research on which diversity advocates have cited and relied does not
emphasize parity may mean that these diversity advocates are satisfied
with something short of parity. While this does not undermine the op-
timism associated with the potential for board diversity effort to yield
meaningful results, it does suggest that those results may not translate
into gender parity.
Additionally, it is not altogether clear whether, and to what ex-
tent, diversity advocates have made the case for gender parity on
boards. On the one hand, diversity advocates clearly have relied on
empirical evidence to highlight the lack of gender parity, while simul-
taneously appearing to make gender parity a goal.188 On the other
hand, when those advocates advance arguments in favor of parity,
those arguments often appear to focus on the importance of achieving
critical mass or diversity more generally, or the presence of “more”
women or “at least three women” on the board.189 Such arguments do
not necessarily require parity. To be sure, there are many reasons why
183 See Smith, supra note 6. R
184 See Krouse, supra note 44. R
185 See id.
186 See Posner, supra note 44. R
187 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 855, 861–64 (2011).
188 See e.g., DELOITTE ACCESS ECON., RESEARCH REPORT: TOWARDS GENDER PARITY:
WOMEN ON BOARDS INITIATIVE 1 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/
Documents/Economics/deloitte-au-toward-gender-parity-women-on-boards-initiative-
041016.pdf [https://perma.cc/49UH-6S5Z].
189 See, e.g., id. at 12–20; Shannon Mantaro, Does Gender Parity Matter on Corporate
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gender parity is important, including that the lack of parity may reflect
unconscious bias or discrimination. It is still unclear if the case for
parity itself—as opposed to some form of diversity with critical
mass—has been made. The lack of such case may be at least one rea-
son why achieving gender parity on boards continues to be difficult.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
There has been considerable momentum associated with board
diversity as it relates to gender. For those who have been pushing for
board diversity for decades, this momentum is refreshing because it
suggests that there may finally be meaningful increase in the number
of women on corporate boards. And in fact, many factors suggest that
an increase may be possible. There is a growing consensus on the ben-
efits of board diversity and that consensus has caused a broad array of
market participants, including some of the most influential members
of the investment community, to support board diversity and to bring
their considerable influence to bear in the push for board diversity.
Investors have expanded their tactics, relying on both direct engage-
ment as well as specific campaigns. These investors target corpora-
tions and their directors based on their lack of board diversity as well
as their failure to engage around the issue of board diversity. And the
empirical trends appear to be positive. Most notably, there is at least
some evidence indicating that boards may have relaxed their reliance
on practices that posed the most challenges for the recruitment of wo-
men directors.
Not all the news, however, is good. Indeed, while the empirical
evidence suggests that some boards are moving away from recruit-
ment practices that disadvantage women, many boards continue to
use them, suggesting that such practices will continue to pose a long-
term problem. Survey data also indicates that directors may not be as
convinced of the benefits of board diversity as the rest of the commu-
nity. Given their significant role in the board nomination process, such
data represents a source of concern for board diversity efforts.
Finally, the pursuit of gender parity on boards may prove particu-
larly challenging. In fact, it is not at all clear that any of the major
advocates of board diversity believe that gender parity is the goal of
board diversity, or otherwise have made the case for gender parity
itself. Hence, even as progress is made with respect to board diversity,
parity may continue to be an elusive goal.
cle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Does-Gender-Parity-Matter-on-Corporate-Boards-13249389.
php [https://perma.cc/K4F9-62YE].
